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OUR CORROSIVE OCEANS: EXPLORING
REGULATORY RESPONSES AND A POSSIBLE ROLE
FOR TRIBES
Weston R. LeMay
Abstract: The world’s oceans act as a carbon sink, absorbing roughly twenty-five percent
of humanity’s carbon dioxide emissions. As a result, ocean acidity has increased sixty
percent since the beginning of the industrial era. Acidification is a burgeoning ocean health
crisis—present levels of acidity already threaten species of oyster, plankton, and salmon.
Disturbingly, the capacity of the American legal system to respond is unclear: the complexity
of climate change-related harms typically precludes a remedy at common law. With respect
to mitigating near-shore acidification, this Comment argues that a regulatory strategy
utilizing the Clean Water Act’s Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) regime holds more
promise than a tort response. Furthermore, in the Pacific Northwest, it may be possible to
bolster TMDL regulation of non-point pollution through engagement with often-overlooked
stakeholders: the Stevens Treaties tribes.

INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2007, oyster larvae at the Whiskey Creek Hatchery
began dying by the millions.1 Located on Netarts Bay in Oregon, the
Whiskey Creek Shellfish Hatchery raised larvae (also known as “seed”)
for shellfish growers along the Pacific Coast.2 Hatchery managers,
scrambling to find the cause of the die off, quickly eliminated bacteria or
disease in their tanks—other private growers had also suffered
significant losses that year, as did wild larvae in Washington’s Willapa
Bay.3 After two years of research, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) scientists suggested a culprit: the rising acidity
of seawater.4 Under laboratory conditions, studies showed that exposure
to increasingly acidic water negatively impacted shell-forming marine
organisms, including oysters.5 One study specifically investigated the
1. Eric Scigliano, The Great Oyster Crash, ONEARTH MAG. (Aug. 17, 2011),
http://archive.onearth.org/article/oyster-crash-ocean-acidification [https://perma.cc/3T7M-S43F].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See generally Scott C. Doney et al., Ocean Acidification: the Other CO2 Problem, 1 ANN. REV.
MARINE SCI. 169 (2009).
5. Id. at 177–78 (summarizing studies showing that exposure to waters with elevated CO2 results
in shell malformation, slower growth, and impaired calcification (the formation of calcium
carbonate shells) in oysters, mussels, and calcifying plankton).
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vulnerability of the Pacific oyster (Cassostrea Gigas, a species grown by
Whiskey Creek) and found that ninety-five percent of the larvae in
acidified water developed malformed shells—or grew no shells at all.6
NOAA scientists, including Dr. Richard Feely, Ph.D., later replicated
these results under real world conditions at the Whiskey Creek
Hatchery.7 By testing the water flowing into the hatchery during a period
of naturally higher acidity, Dr. Feely confirmed that ocean acidification
is—at minimum—a contributing factor to oyster seed mortality.8
Ocean acidification is the process by which seawater becomes more
acidic through the absorption of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2).9
Acidification is a global concern, creating risks for shellfish and
corals—economically and ecologically important organisms which may
struggle to survive in increasingly acidic ocean environments.10 If
scientists’ acidification projections are correct, by the year 2100
seawater will be so corrosive that some organisms may simply
dissolve.11 Simultaneously, the same chemical reaction increasing
seawater acidity also reduces the availability of minerals used by
shellfish and other organisms to build their shells and skeletal

6. Haruko Kurihara et al., Effects of Increased Seawater pCO2 on Early Development of the
Oyster Crassostrea Gigas, 1 AQUATIC BIOLOGY 91, 91 (2007) (showing negative impact on Pacific
oyster larvae from exposure to water with a pH of 7.4 for forty-eight hours). The Pacific oyster was
one of the species that exhibited significantly increased larval mortality during the 2007 low-pH
event. See Scigliano, supra note 1.
7. See generally Alan Barton et al., The Pacific Oyster, Crassostrea Gigas, Shows Negative
Correlation to Naturally Elevated Carbon Dioxide Levels: Implications for Near-term Ocean
Acidification Effects, 57 LIMNOLOGY & OCEANOGRAPHY 698 (2012) (reporting data collected from
hatchery intake waters during a period of natural pH fluctuation).
8. Id. at 703.
9. When CO2 in the atmosphere mixes with seawater, it triggers a chemical reaction that makes
the oceans more acidic. Because human activity releases CO2—known as “anthropogenic” CO2—
into the atmosphere, human pollution is a contributing factor to ocean acidification. Oceans have
absorbed more than thirty percent of the anthropogenic CO2 emitted since the beginning of the
industrial era; during that time, the ocean surface has become significantly more acidic. See infra
Section I.A.
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, The Acid Sea, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. (Apr. 1, 2011),
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/print/2011/04/ocean-acidification/kolbert-text [perma.cc/YM8869BL];
Ocean
Acidification,
WOODS
HOLE
OCEANOGRAPHY
INST.,
http://www.whoi.edu/main/topic/ocean-acidification [https://perma.cc/DP5P-RJ7C] (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015).
11. What Is Ocean Acidification?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/co2/story/What+is+Ocean+Acidification%3F [https://perma.cc/99WCA6RA] (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (showing the shell of a pteropod, a major food source of North
Pacific juvenile salmon, completely dissolving after forty-five days at the pH levels projected for
2100).
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structures.12
Although ocean acidification is a global problem, this Comment
focuses on acidification in the context of the Pacific Northwest. This
region is uniquely vulnerable to acidification, in part because losses to
fish and shellfish harvests could significantly impact the regional
economy—shellfish aquaculture alone represents over $100 million in
annual regional revenue.13 The Pacific Northwest is also home to a
number of fish and shellfish-dependent Native American tribes,
including the Swinomish, the Makah, and the Suquamish.14 These
coastal tribes may be disproportionately impacted by acidification due to
their higher per capita fish consumption. Members of the Suquamish
tribe, for example, consume up to 800 grams of fish per day,15 compared
to the national average of roughly nineteen grams.16 Furthermore, ocean
acidification has the potential to negatively impact tribal treaty rights,
12. Organisms like shellfish are often referred to as “calcifying” organisms because they use
carbonate minerals in seawater to synthesize their shells. A meta-analysis of modern scientific
examinations of the effects of acidification on calcifying confirmed that in general, the scientific
community has reached a consensus: ocean acidification negatively impacts calcification, in part
due to its negative impact on the availability of carbonate ions. See, e.g., Pauline M. Ross et al., The
Impact of Ocean Acidification on Reproduction, Early Development and Settlement of Marine
Organisms, 3 WATER 1005, 1010 (2011) (discussing impacts on enchinoderms and mollusks);
K.R.N. Anthony et al., Ocean Acidification Causes Bleaching and Productivity Loss in Coral Reef
Builders, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17442 (2008), http://www.pnas.org/
content/105/45/17442.full [https://perma.cc/TKL2-A7HY].
13. See Scigliano, supra note 1. A recent University of Oregon study estimates that ocean
acidification has already cost the region’s shellfish industry $110 million. Press Release, Or. State
Univ., Study outlines threat of ocean acidification to coastal communities in the U.S. (Feb. 23,
2015),
http://oregonstate.edu/ua/ncs/archives/2015/feb/study-outlines-threat-ocean-acidificationcoastal-communities-us [https://perma.cc/2QZ8-XWZT]. Globally, the estimated value of fisheries
totals $91.2 billion; coral reef fisheries alone count for $5.7 billion. See Sarah R. Cooley et al.,
Ocean Acidification’s Potential to Alter Global Marine Ecosystem Services, OCEANOGRAPHY, Dec.
2009, at 172, 174.
14. See United States v. Washington, 626 F. Supp. 1405, 1528–31 (W.D. Wash. 1986)
(discussing the importance of fish to the area’s tribes, referred to collectively as the Tulalip Tribes,
in the context of traditional and accustomed fishing grounds); NW. INDIAN APPLIED RESEARCH
INST., NATIVE PEOPLES: THE “MINER’S CANARY” OF CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (Debra McNutt ed.,
2008), http://nwindian.evergreen.edu/pdf/climatechangereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5Y9-DZAN]
(discussing the economic and cultural importance of shellfish to tribes in the Pacific Northwest).
15. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PUB. NO. 12-09-058, FISH CONSUMPTION RATES, at B-3
(2013), https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/documents/1209058.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG4S7UVV].
16. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 93 (2011),
http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st1/fus/fus11/08_percapita2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8H3-TNGU].
Older government estimates are lower still, at roughly five grams per person per day. See ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, ESTIMATED PER CAPITA FISH CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES vii (2002),
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/criteria/health/upload/consumption_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YW9-ZPLS].
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aspects of tribal culture, and spiritual traditions by further depressing
salmon and shellfish populations.17
While the full extent of harm caused by ocean acidification is
unknown, NOAA’s research shows that acidification has already
contributed to millions of dollars in lost revenue by shellfish producers
like the Whiskey Creek Hatchery.18 However, the traditional recourse in
American law for recovering damages—the tort system—has proven to
be an unreliable mechanism for remedying climate change-related
harms.19 In short, the complexity of climate change-related harms is illsuited to the tort system’s rigid model of “duty, breach, . . . causation,
and harm.”20 There is little reason to expect that the outcome would be
any different in the context of ocean acidification. For example, a
shellfish producer harmed by acidification might step forward to bring a
claim. Her losses would be reasonably easy to calculate—the known
monetary value of farmed shellfish makes it straightforward to express
damages as a dollar amount.21 Nevertheless, sustaining a tort claim for
acidification would be an uphill battle. Duty and breach, for example,
are difficult to establish when every human alive contributes to the
problem simply by breathing.22 More fundamentally, the primary cause
of ocean acidification (excessive CO2 pollution)23 is far removed from
the harm (change to seawater chemistry). Accordingly, our hypothetical

17. Pteropods, a type of plankton commonly known as “sea butterfly,” are a major food source of
North Pacific juvenile salmon. Studies show that pteropod development and survival is negatively
impacted by ocean acidification. See Washington, 626 F. Supp. at 1528–31 (discussing the
importance of fish to the Tulalip Tribes in the context of traditional and accustomed fishing
grounds); NW. INDIAN APPLIED RESEARCH INST., supra note 14, at 9 (discussing the economic and
cultural importance of shellfish to tribes in the Pacific Northwest).
18. See generally Barton et al., supra note 7 (reporting data collected from hatchery intake waters
during a period of natural pH fluctuation); Anar Virji, The Great American Oyster Collapse, AL
JAZEERA (Jul. 21, 2014, 10:01 GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/07/greatamerican-oyster-collapse-2014720132433957401.html [https://perma.cc/6928-JLP7] (reporting
losses of up to forty-two percent in Pacific oyster harvests).
19. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1,
44 (2011) (summarizing the incompatibilities between tort standards for recovery and climate
change damages).
20. See, e.g., id. at 9.
21. In this respect, our hypothetical claim actually avoids a challenge typical to climate torts: the
difficulties associated with calculating damages for complex environmental harms. See Sanne H.
Knudsen, The Long-Term Tort: In Search of a New Causation Framework for Natural Resource
Damages, 108 NW. U.L. REV. 475 (2014) (detailing the complexities presented by long-term
environmental harms with respect to damages calculations).
22. Kysar, supra note 19, at 11–12, 18.
23. A more complete discussion of the causes and consequences of ocean acidification follows in
the next section. See infra Section I.A.

18 - LeMay.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

3/27/2016 3:50 PM

OUR CORROSIVE OCEANS

365

plaintiff is likely to find her causal burden insurmountable.24 The study
of acidification is a science, and scientific conclusions about complex
global phenomena are invariably subject to doubt, uncertainty, and
disagreement—all of which heavily favor tort defendants.25 Tort law, as
David Kysar observes, appears “fundamentally ill-equipped to address
the causes and impacts of climate change.”26
Similarly, the current political system is unlikely to provide an
effective legislative solution to ocean acidification. Governments are
aware of climate risks: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) recently repeated its warning that without significant mitigation
of global emissions, the long-term consequences of climate change
become inevitable.27 The IPCC warnings depict shifting climate patterns,
massive losses of species biodiversity, and increasingly frequent extreme
weather events.28 Eighty-one percent of the American public29 and
ninety-seven percent of climate scientists agree that climate change is
real and impacted by human activity.30 Nevertheless, effective legislative
engagement has yet to occur.31 Instead, the nation’s most senior
24. For example, in order to demonstrate causation, a plaintiff must prove every link in the causal
chain. In the climate change context, this arguably leaves plaintiffs with the Herculean task of
isolating a specific defendant’s contribution to ambient pollutants and tracking those molecules
from the moment of emission to the moment of harm. See Kysar, supra note 19, at 3–4.
25. Luciano Butti, The Tortuous Road to Liability: A Critical Survey on Climate Change
Litigation in Europe and North America, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL. J., Winter 2011, at 30, 33
(noting that showing a one-to-one connection between a particular tortfeasor and a specific harm is
a core tenet of tort causality—and arguably unknowable when the harm is driven by a naturally
occurring and dispersed gas like carbon dioxide); see also infra Section I.A.
26. Kysar, supra note 19, at 6.
27. Christopher B. Field et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1, 14 (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/wg2/ar5_wgII_spm_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5EP-QVBW].
28. Id.
29. Coral Davenport & Marjorie Connelly, Most Republicans Say They Back Climate Action, Poll
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/us/politics/mostamericans-support-government-action-on-climate-change-poll-finds.html [https://perma.cc/HLD7FNBX] (reporting on recent polling conducted jointly by the New York Times, Stanford University,
and the nonpartisan research group Resources for the Future).
30. Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ [https://perma.cc/4QRU-U24R] (last visited Feb. 7,
2016). The IPCC’s comprehensive review of climate change further concludes “[i]t is extremely
likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid20th century.” Field at al., supra note 27, at 3 n.1.
31. For example, the most ambitious federal legislative response to ocean acidification, the
Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act of 2009, takes no substantive steps to
mitigate acidification. Omnibus Federal Lands Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–11,
§§ 12401–12409, 123 Stat. 991, 1441–42; see also NOAA OA Plan, NOAA PMEL CARBON
PROGRAM, http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/co2/story/NOAA+OA+Plan [https://perma.cc/JQF4-RL72]
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legislative body appears to be in “climate change denial”: the Senate
recently voted down a non-binding resolution simply recognizing that
climate change exists and is human-influenced.32 Given the lackluster
governmental response to climate change in general, a legislative
solution to ocean acidification (a newer, less understood manifestation of
broader climate change) seems unlikely.
The tort system’s incompatibility and the political system’s
incapacitation indicate that ocean health advocates should look for
remedies in existing environmental laws. Many of these statutes date
back to the pro-environment legislative era of the 1970s—the challenge
is thus to apply the laws of yesterday to the ocean acidification crisis of
today.33 This Comment argues that our nation’s most powerful water
quality law, the Clean Water Act (CWA),34 is the best available tool for
ocean acidification mitigation. In particular, this Comment demonstrates
that modernizing the CWA’s water quality standards (§ 303) could bring
ocean acidification within the Act’s regulatory scope. Waters already
burdened by acidification would fail modern, scientifically defensible
water quality standards.35 Under the requirements of the Act, impacted
waters would then be listed as “impaired” under CWA § 303(d). This
impairment finding would, in turn, trigger the statutory obligation to
develop a TMDL for acidification.36 Because TMDLs focus on holistic
water quality, they require regulation of both point and non-point (i.e.,
diffuse) sources of pollution—thereby providing the legal authority and
regulatory framework necessary to address the diffuse carbon sources
contributing to ocean acidification.37 However, TMDL-based strategies
may be undermined by poor non-point source enforcement.
Nevertheless, in the specific context of acidification-impacted waters in
the Pacific Northwest, this Comment argues that involving local tribal
stakeholders could bolster TMDL enforcement.
The purpose of this Comment is not to argue that TMDLs will fix
ocean acidification. Acidification is a global problem; it will require a

(last visited Jan. 28, 2016).
32. Coral Davenport, Senate Rejects Human Role in Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/us/politics/senate-rejects-human-role-in-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/GW7F-Q845].
33. See, e.g., Miyoko Sakashita, Harnessing the Potential of the Clean Water Act to Address
Ocean Acidification, 36 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 239 (2009).
34. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
35. Sakashita, supra note 33, at 242.
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
37. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
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global solution. This Comment argues that TMDL regulation of local
waters should be part of that solution. Although the CWA can (and
should) regulate airborne pollutants that impair protected waters, other
statutes are already positioned to regulate atmospheric CO2—most
obviously, the Clean Air Act. The strength of the CWA in this context is
the ability of TMDLs to catalogue and regulate individual point and nonpoint pollution sources. TMDLs represent the opportunity to slow or
mitigate the impact of ocean acidification in local waters by these local
contributors to acidification.
Setting the stage for this analysis, Part I briefly reviews the science of
acidification and discusses the ways in which the tort system is illequipped to remedy scientifically complex harms. Given this systemic
incompatibility, this Comment argues that regulation represents a more
promising pathway to mitigation. Part II focuses on one such regulatory
mechanism: the CWA. This Comment argues that meaningful ocean
acidification regulation is within the CWA’s scope. Although the drivers
of acidification are typically diffuse pollutants like atmospheric CO2 and
therefore cannot be regulated by the CWA’s point source permits, the
Act’s § 303 water quality criteria provide an avenue to regulation under
the TMDL regime. While this Comment argues in support of TMDLs for
acidification, it also acknowledges that TMDL regimes are often
criticized for inadequate policing of non-point pollution sources. In
response, Part III advances a new strategy for bolstering TMDL
enforcement in Washington: engagement with acidification-impacted
Native American tribes. In addition to supporting TMDL enforcement
through political pressure, tribes party to the Stevens Treaties could
safeguard tribal rights to fish and shellfish through treaty enforcement
actions to enjoin specific enforcement of TMDLs for non-point
pollutants.
I.

SCIENTIFIC COMPLEXITY AND THE INADEQUACY OF
COMMON LAW REMEDIES
[A]nthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions represent the
paradigmatic anti-tort, a collective action problem so pervasive
and so complicated as to render at once both all of us and none
of us responsible.
—Douglas A. Kysar38
Environmental harms are, in a word, messy. “[D]iffuse and disparate

38. Kysar, supra note 19, at 4.
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in origin, lagged and latticed in effect,”39 the injuries caused by ocean
acidification and other aspects of climate change fit poorly into the tort
system’s model of tortfeasor, victim, and a clear causal chain.40 Instead,
the complexity and uncertainty surrounding these types of environmental
harms favor defendants at each stage of the basic tort analysis: duty,
breach, causation, and damages.41
Section I.A begins by describing the uncertain state of ocean
acidification science. Next, Section I.B discusses why, given this
uncertainty, acidification will be difficult to remedy using the modern
tort regime. Finally, Section I.C examines why a regulatory regime is
better equipped to handle complex environmental harms like ocean
acidification.
A.

Ocean Acidification: Causes and Consequences for Selected
Species

Any successful application of law to ocean acidification must be
grounded in a sound understanding of the basic science.42 Simply put,
ocean acidification is the process by which seawater absorbs CO2 from
the atmosphere, triggering a chemical reaction that increases ocean
acidity.43 This reaction has two key consequences: first, the combination
of H2O and CO2 “consumes” a carbonate ion (CO32- ),44 which reduces
the bioavailability of calcium carbonate (CaCO3) minerals that oysters
and other so-called “calcifying” organisms use to construct their shells
and skeletal structures.45 Second, the reaction decreases the pH of
seawater.46 By breaking the bonds of water molecules (H2O), the
39. Id.
40. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281, 328A (1965) (outlining the
elements of a tort).
41. Id.
42. See Aurora Janke & Marcus Pearson, Breaking the Surface of Ocean Acidification: A
Discussion of Science, Law, and Policy 6 (Spring 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Washington Law Review) (“Any successful ocean acidification solution, whether through law or
policy, must rely on sound science.”).
43. See, e.g., Doney et al., supra note 4; Richard A. Feely et al., Uptake and Storage of Carbon
Dioxide in the Ocean: The Global CO2 Survey, OCEANOGRAPHY, Dec. 2001, at 18; What Is Ocean
Acidification?, supra note 11. Globally, oceans absorb roughly 3.2 gigatons of carbon dioxide per
year—far surpassing the rate of uptake at the beginning of the industrial era. See Peter Tans, An
Accounting of the Observed Increase in Oceanic and Atmospheric CO2 and an Outlook for the
Future, OCEANOGRAPHY, Dec. 2009, at 26, 26. Scientists expect this rate increase further as CO 2
levels continue to rise and terrestrial carbon sinks become saturated. Id. at 32.
44. Doney et al., supra note 4, at 172.
45. See id. at 170.
46. See, e.g., Cooley et al., supra note 13, at 172–73.
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acidification reaction releases some of the component hydrogen (H+) as
“free” hydrogen ions into the water.47 In other words, by absorbing CO2,
oceans increase the concentration of hydrogen ions in seawater; more
hydrogen ions in seawater means a lower ocean pH.48 Seawater with a
lower pH is more acidic.49
Figure 1: Absorbing CO2 Reduces Ocean pH

The two consequences of acidification, decreased carbonate ion
saturation and increased seawater pH, each present risks to marine
organisms. First, reducing the availability of carbonate ions in the water
deprives “calcifying” organisms—including species of oyster, coral, and
plankton—of an essential mineral.50 Calcifying species use calcium
carbonate to construct their shells or skeletal structures.51 Because ocean
acidification reduces the amount of carbonate available to these
organisms, scientists believe calcifying species are particularly

47. Tans, supra note 43, at 34.
48. Id. The pH scale measures from zero (pure acid) to fourteen (pure alkaline). pH is the
negative logarithm of hydrogen ions (H+) in water; as hydrogen ion concentration increases, acidity
goes up and pH goes down.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also Ross et al., supra note 12, at 1008.
51. Tans, supra note 43, at 34; see also Ross et al., supra note 12, at 1008.
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vulnerable to acidification.52 Furthermore, shells made of calcium
carbonate are water soluble.53 Therefore, even if these organisms do
form shells, they may be weakened, malformed, or dissolved by
increasingly corrosive seawater.54
Although ocean acidification’s potential to harm calcifying organisms
is not fully understood, there are known risks for at least two thoroughly
studied species: the Pacific oyster and pteropods. The Pacific oyster is a
mainstay of the Pacific Northwest’s shellfish industry.55 In 2007,
millions of oyster larvae deaths56 on the Washington and Oregon coasts
coincided with a seasonal upwelling event that naturally reduced the pH
of local waters.57 Scientists hypothesized that acidification killed the
oyster larvae.58 Subsequent real-world testing confirmed that low pH
negatively impacts Pacific oyster larvae survival.59 Twenty-four hours
after fertilization, eighty percent of Pacific oyster gametes in reduced pH
water displayed malformed shells—or had formed no shell at all.60
Outside the laboratory, seasonal upwelling events bring water that is
sufficiently acidic to cause nearly one-hundred percent larval mortality.61
Nor are the impacts limited to larvae: for example, scientists also believe
that acidification negatively impacts reproduction, and juvenile oysters
exhibited a ten percent decrease in shell formation and growth rate under
experimental conditions.62
Another closely studied organism is the pteropod (colloquially known
as the “sea butterfly”), a type of calcifying plankton.63 Plankton are an
52. See Ross et al., supra note 12, at 1006 (noting the particular impact on marine organisms at
the larval stage).
53. See, e.g., Doney et al., supra note 4; Feely et al., supra note 43; What Is Ocean
Acidification?, supra note 11.
54. See generally Ross et al., supra note 12 (surveying scientific studies demonstrating the
negative effects of ocean acidification on calcifying organisms, including various shellfish and sea
urchin species at the larval stage).
55. Scigliano, supra note 1.
56. See Craig Welch, Acidity Killed NW Oysters, New Study Says, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 11,
2012, 10:45 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/acidity-in-ocean-killed-nw-oystersnew-study-says/ [https://perma.cc/P55Q-B9GH]; Virji, supra note 18 (reporting further significant
losses of Pacific oysters by shellfish farmers in succeeding years).
57. See Scigliano, supra note 1. An “upwelling event” refers to a natural mixing of colder water
from deeper in the ocean with coastal water. Because deep ocean water tends to be more acidic,
upwellings may increase the acidity of coastal waters. Id.
58. Barton et al., supra note 7, at 699.
59. Id.
60. Kurihara et al., supra note 6, at 96.
61. See Barton et al., supra note 7, at 706.
62. Doney et al., supra note 4, at 177.
63. What Is Ocean Acidification?, supra note 11 (showing the shells of pteropods completely
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irreplaceable component of the marine food web,64 and pteropods are no
exception—they are a key prey species for organisms ranging from krill
to whales.65 Pteropods are also a major food source for North Pacific
juvenile salmon.66 Like the Pacific oyster, pteropods rely on the
availability of carbonate minerals to form their protective shells.67
However, studies suggest that pteropods’ shells may be particularly
vulnerable to corrosion—their shells exhibit microscopic “scoring” at
current levels of acidity, and dissolve completely when exposed to the
projected ocean pH for the year 2100.68 It is important to remember that
even as their shells dissolve, pteropods are simultaneously less able to
synthesize new shell material because the acidification reaction reduces
the bioavailability of shell-forming minerals.69 Given the significance of
these organisms to the marine food web in general—and their
importance to salmon specifically70—the apparent vulnerability of
pteropods to ocean acidification is cause for grave concern.71
B.

Scientific Uncertainty Pervades the Study of Ocean Acidification

Despite scientists’ growing awareness of the danger ocean
acidification poses to select species, the global threat remains poorly
dissolving at the pH levels projected for 2100).
64. See, e.g., WALKER SMITH ET AL., VA. INST. OF MARINE SCI., MARINE PLANKTON FOOD WEBS
AND
CLIMATE
CHANGE
(2008),
http://estuaries.noaa.gov/teachers/pdf/
Plankton_Food_Webs_VIMS.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LBJ-BUHF].
65. Steve Comeau et al., Response of the Arctic Pteropod Limacina Helicina to Projected Future
Environmental
Conditions,
PLOS
ONE,
June
2010,
at
1,
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0011362 [https://perma.cc/BEQ6U5AB].
66. Id.
67. See generally M. Debora Iglesias-Rodriguez et al., Phytoplankton Calcification in a HighCO2 World, 320 SCIENCE 336 (2008).
68. What Is Ocean Acidification?, supra note 11 (showing the shell of pteropods completely
dissolving at the pH levels projected for 2100). The particular vulnerability of pteropod shells to
ocean acidification is likely because of the type of calcium carbonate that pteropods synthesize to
construct their shell material: aragonite. Compared to other forms of the mineral, aragonite is
unusually water soluble (i.e., prone to dissolving). Victoria J. Fabry et al., Impacts of Ocean
Acidification on Marine Fauna and Ecosystem Processes, 65 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 414, 423–24
(2008).
69. Fabry et al., supra note 68, at 417. This parallels the reduced ability to synthesize shell
material observed in juvenile Pacific oysters in low pH conditions. See Doney et al., supra note 4, at
177.
70. Salmon, in their own right, also exhibit vulnerabilities to significantly low pH scenarios. See,
e.g., W.D. Watter et al., Evidence of Acidification of Some Nova Scotian Rivers and Its Impact on
Atlantic Salmon, Salmo Salar, 40 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 462, 472 (1983).
71. Janke & Pearson, supra note 42.
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understood.72 Acidification science involves the measurement of gradual
changes, often spanning decades, across the world’s oceans.73 Given the
scale of the phenomenon, many of scientists’ remaining questions will
require years of study to answer.74 Our incomplete understanding of
acidification is also partially the result of funding limitations, which
often prevent replication of laboratory experiments under real-world
conditions.75 Even where research has produced reliable data, those
findings may not be generally applicable. For example, there is no
guarantee that research into one organism’s acidification tolerance will
shed light on the tolerance of other species.76 As ocean researcher Scott
Doney observed, the fact that most research results stem from speciesspecific laboratory experiments means that “the response of individual
organisms, populations, and communities to more realistic gradual
changes is largely unknown.”77
Furthermore, other contributors to acidification represent potential
confounding variables to any acidification analysis. While there is broad
scientific consensus that CO2 pollution is the primary cause of
acidification,78 the amount of CO2 a waterbody absorbs is not the only
factor that determines its pH.79 This calculation is particularly complex
in coastal waters. For example, in the Pacific Northwest, near-shore
waters become (temporarily) more acidic during seasonal upwelling
events. An “upwelling” refers to the natural mixing of colder, deep
ocean water with coastal waters.80 The deep water brings with it

72. Doney et al., supra note 4, at 184.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; Janke & Pearson, supra note 42.
76. Fabry et al., supra note 68, at 423–24 (summarizing results of studies analyzing responses of
different marine fauna to acidification: North Sea jellyfish exhibited no negative impact from a pH
drop of 8.3 to 8.1; sea bass survived at a pH of 7.25 but fed less frequently; the Greenlip abalone
survived at a pH of 7.39 but grew at a reduced rate).
77. Doney et al., supra note 4, at 184.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Claudine Hauri et al., Ocean Acidification in the California Current System,
OCEANOGRAPHY, Dec. 2009, at 61, 66 (discussing the relationship between nutrient loading and
acidity).
80. Coastal currents in the Pacific Ocean off the coasts of Washington and Oregon drive
upwellings on a seasonal basis. Thus, upwellings must be added to the list of potential contributors
to coastal acidification. Furthermore, upwellings demonstrate that an acidification model developed
for coastal waters may not apply to deep water, and vice versa. See, e.g., Katherine E. Harris et al.,
Aragonite Saturation State Dynamics in a Coastal Upwelling Zone, 40 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS
2720, 2722–24 (2013) (noting that coastal upwelling events cause variation in pH levels and the
structural minerals relied on by some calcifying organisms); Hauri et al., supra note 79, at 66.

18 - LeMay.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

3/27/2016 3:50 PM

OUR CORROSIVE OCEANS

373

nutrients that contribute to the incredible productivity and biodiversity of
the waters off Washington’s coasts;81 however, because deep water also
tends to be more acidic, these nutrients come at the cost of a natural
spike in acidity.82
Indirectly, the nutrients themselves also contribute to acidification.83
In agricultural areas, fertilizer and other terrestrial runoff artificially
increase the amount of nutrients in the water.84 Thus, both agricultural
runoff and upwelling events may elevate nutrient loads in coastal
waters.85 High nutrient loads, in turn, drive phytoplankton blooms—and
when the bloom subsides, the dead phytoplankton sink and decompose.86
Decomposing organic matter releases CO2 into the water, further
increasing its acidity.87 This discussion of seasonal upwelling and
nutrient loads serves as a reminder that atmospheric CO2 is not the only
driver of ocean acidification—local factors contribute to acidification in
specific waterbodies as well. It may not always be possible to isolate the
impact of one driver of acidification from the other causes.
Even assuming the causes of acidification can be isolated, however, it
may still be difficult to identify whether acidification was the sole cause
of a given harm. For example, in addition to being acidic, coastal water
might also exhibit high temperature88 or low dissolved oxygen (DO).89
Temperature, DO, and pH all factor into how hostile or hospitable
marine organisms find their environment.90 Given a singular harm—a
shellfish farmer’s loss of oyster larvae, for example, or a crop of
undersized oysters with malformed shells—it is not always clear which
factor (or combination of factors) is at fault.91
81. See, e.g., Nutrient Pollution of Coastal Waters—Too Much of a Good Thing, NCCOS NEWS
& FEATURES (Jan. 26, 2008), http://coastalscience.noaa.gov/news/coastal-pollution/nutrientpollution-of-coastal-waters-too-much-of-a-good-thing/ [https://perma.cc/YV9J-J88B].
82. Hauri et al., supra note 79, at 66.
83. See, e.g., Nutrient Pollution of Coastal Waters—Too Much of a Good Thing, supra note 81.
84. See, e.g., id.
85. See, e.g., id.
86. See, e.g., id.
87. Hauri et al., supra note 79, at 66.
88. See, e.g., Ross et al., supra note 12, at 1015.
89. See, e.g., Ryan B. Wallace et al., Coastal Ocean Acidification: The Other Eutrophication
Problem, 148 ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 1 (2014); NAT. OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., STATE OF THE COAST REPORT: OXYGEN DEPLETION IN COASTAL WATERS (1998),
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/websites/retiredsites/sotc_pdf/HYP.PDF
[https://perma.cc/VG8B6524].
90. See, e.g., Wallace et al., supra note 89; Nutrient Pollution of Coastal Waters—Too Much of a
Good Thing, supra note 81.
91. Id.
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C.

The Scientific Uncertainty Associated with Ocean Acidification
Precludes an Effective Tort Response

Despite many unanswered questions, there is a growing consensus
within the scientific community that ocean acidification poses serious
risks to marine organisms and ecology.92 However, from a legal
perspective, the existence of uncertainty is an early indication that tort
law is unlikely to provide an adequate remedy for acidification-related
harms.93 While problems arise at each stage of an ocean acidification tort
analysis—duty, breach, and causation—the scope and complexity of
ocean acidification makes proving causation particularly difficult.94
The first step in a tort analysis—defining “due care”—is complicated
by global responsibility for CO2 pollution. The baseline assumption in
tort law is that “every person owes a duty of ordinary care to all
others.”95 In the acidification context, due care might mean forbearing
from actions that contribute to acidification. An immediate issue arises:
given that acidification is driven by atmospheric CO2, every person on
earth “breaches” due care (i.e., contributes to the harm) simply by
breathing.96 In response, some have argued that “duty” in the climate
change context should be reinterpreted as only the “duty to not pollute
unsustainably.”97 According to the United Nations, this would require
each person in the developed world to stay within a “carbon budget” of
2.7 tons of CO2 per year.98 Even assuming this is a practical possibility,99
the problem of scope remains: the millions of people and corporations

92. See, e.g., Doney et al., supra note 4.
93. See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 19, at 3–4 (“Built as it is on a paradigm of harm in which A
wrongfully, directly, and exclusively injures B, tort law seems fundamentally ill-equipped to
address the causes and impacts of climate change . . . .”).
94. See, e.g., id.
95. W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 671 n.1 (2008);
see also David A. Weisbach, Negligence, Strict Liability, and Responsibility for Climate Change, 97
IOWA L. REV. 521 (2012) (discussing an alternative approach, the adoption of a modified strict
liability standard, being tentatively explored in Europe).
96. See Kysar, supra note 19, at 17–19.
97. See id. at 18 (describing these polluters and others as “choke points” in the anthropogenic
carbon cycle).
98. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107, 31 I.L.M. 849, 851; Kysar, supra note 19, at 51 (noting the 2.7 ton per year threshold as the
highest per capita emission level possible without exceeding the two degrees Celsius global
warming “tipping point” for catastrophic climate change).
99. Because 2.7 tons of CO2 emissions is equivalent to driving a standard car for ten weeks, or
taking a single roundtrip flight from San Francisco to New York, it seems unlikely that even
conscientious Americans would be able to meet this target. See Kysar, supra note 19, at 51.
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likely to exceed this budget would result in an impractically large
defendant pool. One response might be to further limit liability at the
proximate cause stage, enforcing breaches of due care against only the
largest polluters: fossil fuel companies, electric utilities, and motor
vehicle manufacturers.100 This list should arguably include federal and
state governments as well.101 Nevertheless, even if plaintiffs are able to
clear these breach and proximate cause hurdles, significant problems
remain at the causation stage.
The complexity of acidification science makes the plaintiff’s duty to
prove causation unreasonably difficult.102 Under most circumstances,
tort plaintiffs must demonstrate a connection between their
particularized harm and the alleged tortfeasor’s actions.103 However, in
the case of climate change, “cause” is far removed from “effect.” Ocean
acidification is no exception: once emitted into the atmosphere, CO2
does not travel directly to the patch of ocean it will eventually acidify.104
The variables mentioned in Section I.B, such as high nutrient loading or
separate water quality issues like low levels of DO, represent potential
intervening causes of the plaintiff’s harm. More fundamentally, the
study of ocean acidification is a science; uncertainty is a part of science.
In this case, and despite advances in scientists’ understanding in recent
years, the remaining scientific uncertainty heavily favors the defendant
in any tort suit.

100. Id. at 18 (describing these polluters and others as “choke points” in the anthropogenic carbon
cycle).
101. For example, in 2010 the federal government emitted 495,546 million tons of CO2 (or CO2
equivalent)—excluding all military and law enforcement emissions. See FY2010 Federal
Government Greenhouse Gas Inventory by Agency, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/fy2010-federal-government-greenhouse-gas-inventory-by-agency
[https://perma.cc/3GH4-3RSG] (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
102. See David A. Weisbach, Negligence, Strict Liability, and Responsibility for Climate Change,
97 IOWA L. REV. 521, 557–58 (2012); Kysar, supra note 19, at 29–32.
103. Absent this clear relationship, plaintiffs would be forced to fall back on either a market share
theory (rarely applied outside the medical drugs context) or a risk-increase theory (which generally
would require plaintiffs to prove that the polluter’s emissions more than doubled the risk of the
plaintiff’s harm) in order to connect the broken links in the causal chain. See Albert C. Lin, Beyond
Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1449–50
(2005) (discussing the limitations of the risk-increase theory); Kysar, supra note 19, at 37
(advocating for several liability over the market share theory); Weisbach, supra note 102, at 557–
58.
104. Diffuse atmospheric CO2 travels from air to water through “atmospheric deposition,” which
models the process by which airborne pollutants, such as mercury or CO2, fall into the water—in
rain, dust, or simply due to gravity. See Impaired Waters and Mercury, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/tmdl/impaired-waters-and-mercury [https://perma.cc/RZJ5-S3NV] (last visited
Feb. 23, 2015) [hereinafter EPA TMDLs].
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II.

APPLICATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT TO OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION

If the common law tort system is not equipped to effectively address
the problem of acidification, stakeholders must look to alternatives: for
example, existing environmental and pollution control regimes. This
Comment argues that America’s most comprehensive water quality law,
the CWA,105 provides an existing regulatory framework that can be
modified to address ocean acidification. In particular, modernizing the
CWA’s outdated water quality standards for acidity could bring ocean
acidification within the regulatory scope of the Act.106 Updating water
quality standards in order to list acidification-burdened waters as
“impaired” under CWA § 303(d) would, in turn, trigger the statutory
requirement to regulate these waters under a TMDL regime.107 A TMDL
for acidification, at minimum, represents a regulatory framework from
which to approach the complex task of ocean acidification regulation.108
The provisions contained within the CWA109 offer the possibility of
meaningful acidification regulation.110 Acidity itself is already classified
as a pollutant under the CWA and is therefore within the regulatory
scope of the Act.111 Nevertheless, any comprehensive regulation of
ocean acidification must address acidification’s primary driver:
excessive levels of anthropogenic CO2. In this respect, acidification fits

105. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1357 (2012)); see also William L. Andreen, Success
and Backlash: The Remarkable (Continuing) Story of the Clean Water Act, J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L.,
Winter
2013,
at
25,
26,
http://groups.law.gwu.edu/jeel/ArticlePDF/4-1-Andreen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WF8B-WRCE] (summarizing the CWA’s development and significance).
106. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33.
107. See, e.g., id.
108. Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs), while arguably an important path towards effective
ocean acidification regulation, may not be the entire answer. See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We
There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act,
27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,389, 10,399–400 (1997) (noting poor TMDL enforcement with respect to
non-point sources); infra Part III (suggesting a possible role for Stevens Treaties tribes in improving
TMDL enforcement).
109. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (outlining the water quality standards regime); id. § 1342(a)
(outlining the NPDES permitting scheme). Because the focus of this paper is the potential for
application of CWA water quality standards to ocean acidification, the author treats CWA § 401
certification as outside the scope.
110. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33.
111. See Clean Water Act (CWA): Overview of CWA, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/lcwa.html [https://perma.cc/LJE2-5WT9] (last visited Mar. 12,
2015).
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uncomfortably within the CWA’s jurisdiction: navigable waters.112
Ocean acidification is a water quality problem driven by air pollution.113
In this sense, Congress’s jurisdictional distinction—that the CWA
presides over water, the Clean Air Act over the air, etc.—is hopelessly
impractical. Cross-media pollution demands cross-media regulation.114
To fulfill its mandate, the CWA must reach beyond the water. Because
the primary driver of ocean acidification is atmospheric CO2,115 holistic
acidification regulation requires the CWA to limit atmospheric CO2
emissions into the air.116
To better explore the applicability of the CWA to acidification, Part II
begins with a review of the relevant statutory provisions. Next, this
Comment argues that the CWA, as currently written, confers to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to regulate ocean
acidification. However, regulating acidification would require updating
the Act’s antiquated water quality standards for acidity. Modern
standards would lead to acidification-burdened waters being listed as
“impaired” under CWA § 303(d), which would trigger the requirement
to promulgate a TMDL for the impaired waters. As this Comment
acknowledges, TMDLs are often poorly enforced with respect to nonpoint sources. Accordingly, Part II concludes by briefly summarizing the
TMDL enforcement critique, and recognizing that this legacy of
uncertain non-point source regulation suggests that some additional
mechanism is needed to bolster enforcement.117
A.

Section 303 of the Clean Water Act Is the Most Applicable
Regulatory Regime to Ocean Acidification

Congress created the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, better
known as the Clean Water Act, to “restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”118 Within this

112. This is true with respect primarily to airborne CO2. Other drivers of acidification, such as
nutrient runoff, encounter no such awkwardness. See supra Section I.B. More importantly, TMDLs
for mercury demonstrate that the CWA can “reach the air” under certain circumstances.
113. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33.
114. Id.
115. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 28 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2015) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN
AND COASTAL LAW].
116. Id. at 38–41.
117. This Comment advances the argument that in the Pacific Northwest, tribal rights under the
Stevens Treaties represent a compelling option. See infra Part III.
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
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broad mandate, Congress directed the EPA to protect “water quality
which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and
wildlife.”119 Accordingly, the CWA includes two primary regulatory
mechanisms: the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES)120 and the § 303 Water Quality Standards (WQS).121 Although
often treated as separate regimes, the NPDES scheme and the WQS are
actually complementary mechanisms: the NPDES imposes effluent
limitations on specific point source polluters, while water quality
standards allow management of smaller point and non-point sources that
might otherwise escape regulation.122 Of these two mechanisms,
however, only § 303 is likely applicable to ocean acidification.123
1.

NPDES Permits Are Inapplicable to CO2 Regulation Because
Atmospheric CO2 Is Not Delivered to Water from a “Point Source”

The NPDES creates a permitting requirement for each lawful (1)
discharge of (2) a pollutant into (3) protected waters.124 To qualify as a
“discharge,” a point source (a “discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance”) must deliver the pollutant to jurisdictional waters.125
Regardless of the harm a pollutant causes to water quality, it must
emanate from a point source to trigger the NPDES permitting
requirement. The point source provision thus limits the program’s
scope—a regulator may not utilize NPDES to control a known pollutant
flowing into jurisdictional waters until she has identified a point source
that “delivers” that pollutant to the water.126
The point source provision most likely renders the NPDES regime
inapplicable to ocean acidification. Even though acidity is a pollutant
regulated by the CWA,127 and coastal waters are jurisdictional,128 the
119. Id.
120. See id. § 1342(a)(1).
121. See id. § 1313(a)–(c). This Comment’s focus is § 303’s capacity to address non-point air
pollution; due to length concerns, the author treats CWA § 401 certification as outside the scope.
122. EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976).
123. See generally Sakashita, supra note 33.
124. Id.
125. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
126. See, e.g., Kristin Carden, Comment, South Florida Water Management District v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 549 (2004) (observing that the Supreme
Court’s mechanical consideration of the point source definition precludes considerations of
environmental impact and justice). The point source definition also explicitly exempts return flows
from agriculture, § 1362(14), which contribute to coastal ocean acidification by increasing nutrient
loads. See supra Section I.C.
127. Clean Water Act (CWA): Overview of CWA, supra note 111 (listing pH as a conventional
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CO2 gas that is the primary driver of acidification is not “delivered” to
the ocean via a point source. Instead, CO2—in diffuse, gaseous form—
typically reaches the water through the slow process of atmospheric
deposition.129 Therefore, even if the CO2 originates from a “discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance”130 (such as a power plant smoke
stack),131 it is delivered to seawater through indirect means.132
Courts appear unwilling to tolerate even minimal “air gaps” between
the point of emission and the point of entry into water.133 For example,
in Alaska Community Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Services,
LLC,134 the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska addressed
whether pollutants blown from a coal dust pile into a nearby bay could
be subject to NPDES permitting requirements. The court held that the
dust was exempt from NPDES because “coal blown into the Bay as
airborne dust is not a point source discharge.”135 While the court readily
identified the coal dust pile as the source of the pollutant,136 it was not a
“point source” as understood in the CWA context because it did not
deliver the dust directly to the water.137 A “no air gap” rule seems
implicit to the court’s analysis. Even though the dust floated only a short
distance, the court did not consider air to qualify as a “confined and
discrete conveyance.”138 In a parallel case, Chemical Weapons Working
Group, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Army,139 the Tenth Circuit was
more direct: “common sense dictates that [smoke] stack emissions
constitute discharges into the air—not water—and are therefore beyond
pollutant under the CWA).
128. The CWA protects navigable waters, including coastal oceans. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7);
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732 (2006).
129. See EPA TMDLs, supra note 104.
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
131. See, e.g., Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2012, ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html
[https://perma.cc/LC5B-EL4Q] (last visited May 20, 2015).
132. See CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW, supra note 115, at 50.
133. See, e.g., Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Servs., LLC, 940 F. Supp. 2d
1005, 1022 (D. Alaska 2013).
134. 940 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (D. Alaska 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 765 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir.
2014).
135. Id. at 1022.
136. In fact, the court clarified that the coal dust pile would indeed be subject to regulation under
the NPDES program if the pollutants traveled via confined conveyance from pile to water. See id.
137. See id. at 1022.
138. Id. at 1023.
139. Chem. Weapons Working Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir.
1997).
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§ 301(f)’s reach.”140 These cases strongly suggest that the NPDES point
source requirement renders § 301 inapplicable to the diffuse atmospheric
CO2 driving ocean acidification.141
2.

The CWA’s Water Quality Standards Regime Is a Better Fit for
Regulating Ocean Acidification

In contrast with the NPDES scheme, the CWA’s § 303 WQS regime
should apply to ocean acidification.142 NPDES focuses on reducing the
effluent discharges of discreet polluters; § 303 aims to protect the overall
quality of jurisdictional waters.143 Accordingly, the regulatory “reach” of
the standards encompasses small or diffuse sources of pollution that
might otherwise go unregulated.144 Ocean acidification, as a water
quality issue primarily caused by the aggregate impact of diffuse CO2
pollution, sits squarely within the purview of § 303.145
Section 303 of the CWA requires states to promulgate three types of
water quality standards: numeric standards, narrative standards, and
designated uses.146 States first establish the designated uses for a given
waterbody, which refers to both human uses (e.g., recreation) and natural
uses (e.g., fish habitat and breeding grounds).147 Next, the responsible
entity promulgates numerical standards (the maximum acceptable load
of each pollutant in a given waterway) and narrative criteria that protect
the continued enjoyment of the designated uses.148 In order to achieve
this goal, is it important that the water quality standards are “based on
the latest scientific information.”149
140. Id. at 1490.
141. A possible counterargument may be found in pesticides cases, in which courts have held that
helicopters spraying pesticides onto water are “point sources”—despite the air gap. These cases are
distinguishable, first because the air gaps are arguably de minimis, and more importantly, because
the spraying equipment used differs from a source like a smoke stack because it was designed for
the specific purpose of delivering pollutants to water. See Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cty.,
600 F.3d 180, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that helicopters spraying mosquito-control pesticides
were CWA point sources); League of Wilderness Defs. v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that when pesticides are sprayed directly from aircraft onto water, requirements for
point source classification are met).
142. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33.
143. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2012); id. § 1313(a)–(c); 40 C.F.R. § 130.3 (2015).
144. See EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976)
(discussing the complementary nature of the NPDES and WQS regimes).
145. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33.
146. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1); id. § 1313(a)–(c); 40 C.F.R. § 130.3.
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
148. Id.
149. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10.
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The EPA also publishes its own water quality criteria, which
represent a “minimum bar” that state standards must meet.150 EPA
regulations specify that, like the state standards, the EPA’s national
“baselines” should be based on modern science.151 The EPA standards
serve the additional purpose of making sure the agency has a continuing
seat at the table during state-level water quality discussions. The EPA
standards also provide the agency with leverage over state standardsetting agencies: if the EPA updates its own standards, states must either
adjust their water quality criteria to match, or supply a scientifically
defensible alternative.152
The argument that the CWA can “reach” ocean acidification is
grounded in the duty § 303 imposes on states to continuously monitor
the water quality of state waters.153 Under § 303(d), if a given body of
water fails any of the water quality standards, states have the obligation
to list that waterbody as “impaired.”154 EPA regulations also require
states to identify the cause of impairment, identifying the “pollutants
causing or expected to cause violations of the applicable water quality
standard.”155 Thus, if a state like Washington were to list a stretch of its
coastal waters as “impaired” due to ocean acidification, the state would
have to identify CO2 as a contributing pollutant. Despite Washington’s
active political role in the debate surrounding ocean acidification,156 the
State has thus far declined to list any coastal waters as “impaired” due to

150. See id. § 131.11(b); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
151. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10.
152. See id.; Sakashita, supra note 33, at 243. Previously, the Center for Biological Diversity
(CBD) has also unsuccessfully attempted to petition Washington and Oregon directly to include
acidified coastal waters in their “impaired” lists under CWA § 303(d). See Complaint at 10, Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. U.S. EPA, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1177 (W.D. Wash. 2015) [hereinafter CBD
Complaint].
153. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33 (detailing the CWA application strategy for ocean
acidification); 33 U.S.C § 1313(b)(1), (b)(3), (d). Thus, failure of the mandatory numeric, narrative
or non-degradation standards, or the necessary for propagation baseline standard, would justify an
“impaired” listing. See id.
154. 33 U.S.C § 1313(b)(1), (b)(3), (d).
155. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(4).
156. For example, Governor Gregoire organized the 2012 Blue Ribbon Panel on Ocean
Acidification to investigate the threat acidification poses to the state and its citizens. See generally
WASH. STATE BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON OCEAN ACIDIFICATION, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION: FROM
KNOWLEDGE
TO
ACTION
SUMMARY
REPORT
(2012),
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/2012report_summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y3WWVBCC]; see also 2012 Panel Members and Meetings, WASH. DEP’T ECOLOGY,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/panel.html [https://perma.cc/F27W-GBA9] (last visited
Mar. 11, 2015) (containing written and video footage to the Panel’s meetings).
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acidification.157 The EPA, for its part, approved158 Washington’s most
recent impaired waters list despite this omission.159
B.

Modernized WQS at the State, Federal, or Qualified Tribal Level
Could Allow TMDL Regulation of Acidification

Water quality standards for acidity already exist under the CWA.160
These standards, however, are inadequate. Near-shore coastal waters like
those off the Washington and Oregon coasts can exhibit a pH range from
6.5 units (slightly acidic) to nine units (alkaline) without violating the
current standards.161 In the context of ocean chemistry, this “acceptable”
pH range allowed by the CWA—a full 2.5 units—is so overbroad as to
be almost meaningless. Recall that the 0.1 unit decrease in ocean pH
observed since the start of the industrial era corresponds to a logarithmic
thirty percent increase in ocean acidity.162 In this context, it is clear that
the CWA’s pH standards allow for radical changes in ocean chemistry
with no regulatory response. However, if these standards were updated
to reflect a more modern understanding of ocean chemistry, waters
already burdened by acidification would have to be listed as “impaired”
waters under § 303(d), leading to a TMDL for acidification.
1.

The CWA’s Standards for Acidity, First Promulgated in 1976, Do
Not Reflect the “Latest Science”
The baseline standards for pH in the CWA are outdated and

157. Water Quality: Current EPA Approved Assessment, WASH. DEP’T ECOLOGY,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wq/303d/currentassessmt.html
[https://perma.cc/E26E-6CYZ]
(last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (noting that Washington’s Section 303(d) list, which does not include any
waters impaired by acidification, was prepared in accordance with the state water quality standards,
listed at section 173-201A of the Washington Administrative Code).
158. The EPA is tasked with reviewing the impaired waters lists submitted by each state for
approval. If the EPA does not approve the list, the agency has thirty days to identify waters that
should have been listed as impaired. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2); 40 C.F.R § 130.7(d)(2). This
includes a public consultation requirement. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2); 40 C.F.R § 130.7(d)(2).
159. See Water Quality Current EPA Approved Assessment, supra note 157.
160. See
National
Recommended
Water
Criteria,
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/current/index.cfm#C
[https://perma.cc/9W2Y5HH3] (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
161. See, e.g., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PUB. NO. 06-10-091, WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS FOR SURFACE WATERS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 21 (2012)
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-12/documents/wawqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENZ7APRR].
162. See Tans, supra note 43, at 34.
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insufficient.163 Two WQS set out the acceptable pH ranges for CWAprotected waters: the open ocean standard and the freshwater standard.164
Both were initially promulgated in 1976.165 The open ocean standard sets
6.5 to 8.5 units as an acceptable pH range, while the fresh water standard
allows for a range of 6.5 to 9 pH units.166 Coastal zones, which exhibit
natural pH variability, are evaluated according to the more flexible fresh
water standard.167
Coastal waters present a regulatory challenge due to their chemical
complexity.168 Although the coastal standard’s acceptable range—6.5 to
9 pH units169—is even more expansive than the open ocean standard, the
pH of near-shore water is naturally more dynamic.170 For example,
seasonal upwelling events result in significant pH variations in some
coastal waters.171 Nevertheless, if the CWA is to achieve Congress’s
goal of protecting fish and shellfish,172 a “floor” of 6.5 pH units for
coastal zones is dangerously tolerant of acidification.173 For example,
acidification research on the Pacific oyster demonstrated impairment at a
pH of 7.4174—significantly less acidic than the pH of 6.5 allowed by the
coastal WQS. Furthermore, scientists question whether WQS for coastal
zones should include a fixed pH range at all.175 For example, ocean
163. National Recommended Water Criteria, supra note 160.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. The “normal” pH of surface water in the open ocean is roughly 8.2 (slightly basic). See,
e.g., Peter G. Brewer & James Barry, Rising Acidity in the Ocean: The Other CO2 Problem, SCI.
AM. (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/rising-acidity-in-the-ocean/
[https://perma.cc/D8AZ-YQMR]. With a “floor” of 6.5 pH units, the current standard thus allows
for a radical change in ocean chemistry before requiring waters to be listed as impaired.
Alternatively, the WQS do provide that a smaller shift in pH—if sudden—can also trigger an
impairment finding. However, even this provision allows for a change of 0.2 pH units—roughly
sixty percent—prior to impairment. See National Recommended Water Criteria, supra note 160.
167. See National Recommended Water Criteria, supra note 160.
168. Janke & Pearson, supra note 42.
169. National Recommended Water Criteria, supra note 160.
170. Harris et al., supra note 80, at 2720 (noting that coastal upwelling events cause variation in
pH levels and the structural minerals relied on by some calcifying organisms).
171. Id.
172. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
173. Kurihara et al., supra note 6Error! Bookmark not defined., at 91 (showing negative impact
on Pacific oyster larvae from exposure to water with a pH of 7.4 for forty-eight hours).
174. Id.
175. Aaron L. Strong et. al., Ocean Acidification 2.0: Managing Our Changing Coastal Ocean
Chemistry, BIOSCIENCE, May 28, 2014, at 4 (advocating for data-based study of the drivers of pH
change to facilitate the development of dynamic, zone-specific management practices). Others
advocate for the promulgation of entirely new standards tracking ocean acidification indicators
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chemistry researcher Aaron Strong advocates for a science-based
management scheme customized to each coastal zone.176 Of course,
developing a dynamic and data-driven management approach would
complicate the regulatory process. Difficulty, however, does not justify
inaction.
2.

States, the EPA and Certain Native American Tribes Have the
Authority to Promulgate New WQS for Ocean Acidification

Scientific understanding of ocean acidification has advanced since
1976. As discussed above,177 agency regulations state that the WQS
must “reflect the latest scientific knowledge.”178 The EPA and the states,
with their forty-year-old pH standards, are currently failing this mandate.
While each actor has the authority—and responsibility—to promulgate
modernized WQS, for the sake of efficiency the EPA should be the “first
mover.”179 Because the EPA’s national WQS act as a statutory
minimum, a strengthened federal WQS obliges all responsible states to
update their own standards to match.180 This is the strategy advanced by
the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD), an organization that has
actively advocated for water quality standards that better reflect the
threat of ocean acidification.181 However, after years of EPA
resistance,182 it may be time to cast a wider net. One alternate strategy
other than pH. See, e.g., Alexandria B. Boehm et al., Ocean Acidification Science Needs for Natural
Resource Managers of the North American West Coast, OCEANOGRAPHY, June 2015, 170, 173,
http://dx.doi.org/10.5670/oceanog.2015.40 [https://perma.cc/6HNN-VVTS] (advocating for a WQS
specific to aragonite saturation). Because the state obligation to promulgate a TMDL is triggered by
waters that fail any WQS, the scientific debate over how best to update the CWA is outside the
scope of this Comment.
176. See Strong et al., supra note 175, at 4; Boehm et al., supra note 175, at 173.
177. See supra Section II.A.2.
178. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2012).
179. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Petition for Revised pH Water Quality Criteria Under
Section 304 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314, to Address Ocean Acidification, Before the
EPA (Dec. 18, 2007) [hereinafter CBD Petition], http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/
oceans/pdfs/section-304-petition-12-18-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/EE3E-UPGV].
180. 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b) (2015).
181. See, e.g., CBD Petition, supra note 179.
182. See generally Sakashita, supra note 33. The CBD first petitioned, then sued, the EPA in
order to compel the agency to modernize its aging WQS. See CBD Petition, supra note 179. The
parties ultimately settled—the EPA agreed to evaluate the issue, initiated a public comment process,
and encouraged states to update their WQS. See Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity,
Settlement Will Require EPA to Evaluate How to Regulate Ocean Acidification Under the Clean
Water Act (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2010/oceanacidification-03-11-2010.html [https://perma.cc/36GN-PMHN]; Clean Water Act Section 303(d):
Notice of Call for Public Comment on 303(d) Program and Ocean Acidification, 75 Fed. Reg.
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might be to engage with a new type of institutional partner: selected
Native American tribes.
Tribes with “Treatment as a State” (TAS) status183 under the CWA
could be powerful partners in the campaign against ocean acidification.
Tribes have been able to petition the EPA for TAS status, which allows a
tribe to manage CWA programs and exercise delegated authority as if it
were a state,184 since 1987.185 CWA and EPA regulations set out four
partially overlapping requirements that a tribe must satisfy to receive
TAS: (1) federal recognition, (2) capacity to carry out governmental
functions over its territory, (3) encumbrance with the governmental
authority necessary to regulate water quality, and (4) capacity to
administer an effective water quality program.186
Once granted TAS status, a tribe is eligible to take over management
of various CWA programs within its territory.187 This is a powerful tool
for tribes, potentially including the authority to set water quality
standards and implementation plans (§ 303), to impose conditions on
federal permits in order to ensure compliance with tribal WQS (§ 401),
and to issue NPDES permits (§ 402).188 Tribes would have the same
powers and responsibilities as states—including the duty to promulgate
WQS “reflecting the latest scientific knowledge.”189 Also like states,
tribal standards can be more stringent than the federal baseline.190 This is
consistent with both the exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty and the
EPA’s interpretation of the CWA.191
Tribal administration of CWA § 303 represents a unique opportunity
to aim the CWA’s water quality regime squarely at the problem of ocean
acidification. The EPA has recognized forty-nine tribes as eligible to

13,537, 13,537–540 (Mar. 22, 2010). However, the process resulted in no binding obligations, and
none of the responsible parties promulgated modern standards for acidification.
183. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); see also Paul M. Drucker, Wisconsin v. EPA: Tribal Empowerment
and State Powerlessness Under § 518(e) of the Clean Water Act, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 323
(2002).
184. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); see also Drucker, supra note 183.
185. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e).
186. Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (2015).
187. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e).
188. See Drucker, supra note 183, at 341.
189. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1).
190. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423 (10th Cir. 1996).
191. Id. (“We conclude that the EPA’s construction of the 1987 amendment to the Clean Water
Act—that tribes may establish water quality standards that are more stringent than those imposed by
the federal government—is permissible because it is in accord with powers inherent in Indian tribal
sovereignty.”).
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manage the WQS program192—fourteen of those are in EPA Region Ten,
which includes the Pacific Northwest.193 Among those fourteen tribes, at
least the Lummi,194 Makah,195 and Swinomish196 are potentially impacted
by ocean acidification (because they have tidelands or coastal waters
within their reservations). These tribes represent a nexus of relevant
interests and authority: non-state entities with jurisdiction over coastal
waters impacted by acidification,197 economic and legal interests in
shellfish198 and other organisms vulnerable to ocean acidification,199 and
the potential statutory authority to promulgate water quality standards
for pH.200
3.

Stricter WQS Could Lead to Regulation of Ocean Acidification via
the CWA’s TMDL Provision

Given evidence that coastal waters in the Pacific Northwest are
already impacted by acidification,201 these waters would likely fail to
meet modern and sufficiently rigorous water quality standards for
acidification.202 The CWA requires states to publish a § 303(d)
“impaired waters” list that highlights each waterbody failing one or more
WQS.203 This impairment finding triggers the statutory duty to regulate
the pollutants responsible.204 Specifically, the state must establish and

192. Indian Tribal Approvals, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/
standards/wqslibrary/approvtable.cfm [https://perma.cc/5955-BFB7] (last visited May 29, 2015).
193. Id.
194. A Sovereign People, LUMMI NATION, http://www.lummi-nsn.org/website/index2.html
[https://perma.cc/V9HV-7QB4] (last visited Mar. 23, 2015) (noting that the Lummi reservation
includes 13,000 acres of tidelands).
195. History About the Makah and More, MAKAH TRIBE, http://makah.com/makah-tribal-info/
[https://perma.cc/2XED-PUZ5] (last visited May 29, 2015) (providing general information about
the Makah tribe and its territory, abutting Neah Bay).
196. The
Swinomish
People,
SWINOMISH
INDIAN
TRIBAL
CMTY.,
http://www.swinomish.org/who-we-are/the-swinomish-people.aspx
[https://perma.cc/K7GY8MCQ] (last visited May 29, 2015) (noting that the Swinomish reservation includes 2900 acres of
tidelands).
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
199. See supra Section I.B.
200. See Indian Tribal Approvals, supra note 192; 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2012).
201. See, e.g., Kurihara et al., supra note 6, at 91 (showing negative impact on Pacific oyster
larvae from exposure to acidic water within currently observable pH ranges).
202. See CBD Petition, supra note 179; CBD Complaint, supra note 152.
203. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(1), (b)(3), (d)(2) (2015).
204. See CBD Complaint, supra note 152.
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enforce a TMDL for each contributing pollutant.205 The TMDL for a
given pollutant is the maximum amount that can enter a waterbody each
day.206 This is the heart of the CWA application theory: updated water
quality standards, when breached, lead to mandatory TMDL regulation
of the pollutants driving ocean acidification.207
Importantly, TMDL regulation includes non-point sources of
pollution. States calculate TMDL thresholds by examining all sources of
pollution—both large individual point sources and smaller, diffuse nonpoint sources.208 Limits for each pollutant contributing to impairment are
incorporated into statewide water quality management plans.209
Therefore, a TMDL for acidification could authorize state regulation of
both point and non-point emissions.210 In the context of coastal ocean
acidification, the TMDL might include drivers of acidification such as
point and non-point releases of acidic chemicals and nutrient-rich
agricultural runoff.211 In theory, the TMDL would also include CO2
emissions, the pollutant known to be the primary cause of ocean
acidification.
Regulating airborne gas with a water quality statute is a pragmatic
necessity with respect to CWA regulation of ocean acidification.212 It is
likely, nevertheless, to be jurisdictionally problematic. However, there is
precedent for CWA regulation of airborne pollutants—the CWA already
regulates airborne mercury,213 polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),214 and
compounds causing acid rain.215 Mercury is perhaps the strongest
example: thousands of waterbodies appear on state § 303(d) impaired

205. Id.
206. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2012).
207. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33, at 244.
208. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e); 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.6, 130.7(d)(2).
209. 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.6, 130.7(d)(2). Specifically, state implementation plans translate the
maximum allowable pollution load into a “pollution budget,” which is divided between local point
sources (“wasteload allocation”) and non-point sources (“non-point source load allocation”). Id.
§ 130.2(h).
210. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e); 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.6, 130.7(d)(2).
211. See supra Section I.A.2 (discussing contributors to ocean acidification other than CO2).
212. See generally Sakashita, supra note 33.
213. See EPA TMDLs, supra note 104.
214. Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are a class of 209 PCB isomers used in electrical
capacitors, turbines, and other industrial applications. They are typically carcinogenic, and
inhalation is one of the primary delivery methods. See Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), UNIV.
NEB.,
http://dwb4.unl.edu/Chem/CHEM869E/CHEM869ELinks/ntp-server.niehs.nih.gov/htdocs/
8_RoC/RAC/PCBs.html [https://perma.cc/JB3G-N6CV] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).
215. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33, at 244.
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waters lists due to mercury pollution.216 These impairment findings
resulted in the development of TMDLs for airborne mercury.217
According to the EPA, “[i]n many waterbodies, mercury originates
largely from air sources, such as coal-fired power plants and
incinerators.”218 Airborne mercury reaches these waterbodies the same
way airborne CO2 reaches the ocean: through atmospheric deposition.219
TMDLs for mercury demonstrate that it is both legally and technically
feasible to regulate airborne pollutants under the CWA.220 Because
atmospheric deposition results in airborne mercury polluting water, it is
proper—even necessary—for the CWA to “reach” into the air.221
Mercury and CO2 are functionally analogous: both are pollutants that
can be emitted into the atmosphere, yet pollute the water.222 The result is
the same—a pollutant crossing from one medium (air) into another
(water). By allowing states to regulate airborne mercury emissions,
TMDLs for mercury arguably pave the way for application of the CWA
to CO2.223
Unfortunately, TMDL-based strategies have a potentially fatal flaw:
enforcement. When faced with the daunting task of actually
implementing TMDLs, states often focus on point sources over nonpoint sources.224 This tendency is understandable—non-point source
pollution is, by definition, decentralized, often difficult to identify, and
correspondingly expensive to regulate.225 Oliver Houck, one of the
nation’s leading TMDL scholars, has outlined the long history of
lackluster enforcement with respect to non-point sources.226 According
to Houck, the most basic weakness of the program is the lack of
216. EPA TMDLs, supra note 104.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. The EPA has conducted years of research into modeling the “spread” of airborne mercury
pollution, and provides guidance on its website for entities seeking to promulgate TMDL quantities.
Id.; see also EPA, NO. 453/R-01-009, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT ATMOSPHERIC
DEPOSITION: A HANDBOOK FOR WATERSHED MANAGERS (2001). While the specific models would
not apply to carbon dioxide, similar principles apply. Id.
221. See, e.g., EPA TMDLs, supra note 104.
222. See id. (discussing deposition of airborne CO2 and mercury).
223. See, e.g., id.
224. See, e.g., OLIVER A. HOUCK, CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY AND
IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 2002); Houck, supra note 108.
225. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be
Done?, 65 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 479, 479 (1989) (summarizing the challenges regulators face when
addressing non-point source pollution).
226. See HOUCK, supra note 224.
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effective EPA oversight.227 Officially, the EPA has approval power over
state TMDLs.228 In reality, this power is strictly limited. The EPA can
only compel TMDL enforcement by rejecting the state’s implementation
plan. This rejection authority is limited to plans that are
“impracticable.”229 In other words, an ineffective TMDL implementation
plan, by itself, is not grounds for disapproval by the EPA.230 Ultimately,
it seems that a TMDL for acidity is a step in the right direction—but not
a regulatory silver bullet.231
III. A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR TRIBES IN ENCOURAGING NONPOINT SOURCE ENFORCEMENT
Updating the CWA’s WQS to obtain a TMDL for ocean acidification
could breathe new life into the law.232 However, the TMDL enforcement
issue raises questions about this strategy’s likely real-world impact.
Accordingly, Part III of this Comment offers a possible fix: engagement
with select Native American tribes. In the Pacific Northwest, tribes party
to the Stevens Treaties should be treated as key stakeholders in the fight
against ocean acidification. Specifically, this Comment argues that tribal
treaty rights to fish and shellfish could be used to compel state
regulatory action—including enforcement of TMDLs.233
Washington State’s first governor, Isaac Stevens, negotiated a series
of land control treaties with the Native American tribes in the region.234
Known collectively as the “Stevens Treaties,” these agreements
exchanged grants of land to settlers for (among other things) guarantees
of tribal fishing rights.235 As demonstrated by the landmark United
227. Id.; Peter M. Lacy, Addressing Water Pollution from Livestock Grazing After ONDA v.
Dombeck: Legal Strategies Under the Clean Water Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 617, 623–24 (2000)
(asserting that the sections of CWA dealing with nonpoint source pollution, sections 319 and 208,
have failed because they are largely driven by federal grants and do not provide EPA with effective
enforcement authority).
228. See, e.g., 40 CFR § 130.7(d) (2015).
229. See, e.g., HOUCK, supra note 224; Lacy, supra note 227, at 623–24.
230. See, e.g., HOUCK, supra note 224.
231. See, e.g., id.
232. See supra Part II.
233. See Treaty of Point Elliot art. 5, Jan. 22, 1855, http://www.goia.wa.gov/treaties/
treaties/pointelliot.htm [https://perma.cc/6AG8-VSYE]; United States v. Washington (Washington
I), 384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975)
(summarizing case history through 1975 and holding the Stevens Treaties imbue the tribal parties
with federally-protected rights to fish).
234. See, e.g., Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233.
235. See id., at art. 5.
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States v. Washington line of cases,236 the Stevens Treaties establish
federally protected tribal rights to harvest fish and shellfish.237 Because
these rights are meaningless if there are no fish or shellfish left,
Washington has an obligation to preserve the fisheries.238 Accordingly,
the Stevens Treaties Tribes (“Tribes”) may have a colorable claim
against Washington State based on its lack of response to the threat of
ocean acidification.239
While the Tribes could bring this treaty-based allegation as a standalone claim, the best chance of achieving meaningful regulations may
actually be to combine a treaty enforcement claim with the TMDL
strategy discussed in Part II. If updated water quality standards led to a
TMDL for acidification, a treaty enforcement claim might be able to
address the criticism240 of TMDLs (lackluster non-point source
enforcement) by enjoining the state to undertake specific enforcement
actions.241 This approach re-conceptualizes the TMDL as an
enforcement structure—lacking the desired real-world effect by itself,
but capable of channeling an external source of legal authority.
To better explore the possibility of a treaty rights claim as a response
to ocean acidification, Section III.A begins by outlining the tribal
interests threatened by acidification. Section III.B then turns to the
United States v. Washington line of cases, which establish that
Washington State has a federally enforceable duty to safeguard treatyprotected fish and shellfish. Of particular interest is the “culverts case,” a
sub-proceeding of United States v. Washington.242 In that case, a federal
district court judge ordered Washington to remove or repair fishblocking culverts beneath state roads.243 Currently on appeal to the Ninth
Circuit,244 the culverts litigation demonstrates that tribal treaty interests
236. See, e.g., Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 401.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5.
240. See, e.g., HOUCK, supra note 224.
241. This is analogous to the culverts sub-proceeding, in which the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington enjoined the State from removing fish-blocking culverts that
deprived tribes of access to treaty-protected fish. See United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d
828, 889–90 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (discussing the six-year history of the culverts sub-proceeding).
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. A three-judge panel heard oral arguments in Seattle on October 16, 2015. As of this writing,
the Ninth Circuit has not yet issued an opinion. See United States v. Washington, No. 13-35474,
U.S.
COURTS
FOR
NINTH
CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/
view.php?pk_id=0000014845 [https://perma.cc/4AAZ-9E92] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016)
(containing the docket information and audio recordings of the oral arguments).
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are sufficiently robust to compel state conservation action.245 If upheld,
the culverts case represents a possible model for a treaty enforcement
action based on ocean acidification.
A.

Ocean Acidification Threatens Protected Tribal Interests

Ocean acidification threatens tribal welfare because it negatively
affects fish and shellfish that are economically, culturally, and
religiously important to tribal communities.246 By harming pteropods, a
key food source for juvenile salmon,247 acidification threatens
populations of salmon that Pacific Northwestern tribes harvest for food
and sale.248 Shellfish like the Pacific oyster are also at risk.249 Like
salmon, shellfish are important resources for tribes like the Lummi 250
and the Swinomish,251 whose reservations include thousands of acres of
tidelands suitable for shellfish cultivation. Of course, tribal interests in
fish and shellfish go beyond cultural and economic concerns—because
their right to take fish is codified by treaty, it is also a colorable legal
interest.252
In 1854 and 1855, Native American tribes residing in what is now
Washington State entered into a series of agreements allocating land and
resources between the native tribes and western settlers. Known as the
Stevens Treaties (“Treaties”), these agreements included language
guaranteeing the Tribes the right to continue their traditional fishing
practices: “The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds
and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all
citizens of the Territory . . . .”253 Intended to secure vital resources for

245. See Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 889–99.
246. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Doney et al., supra note 4, at 177.
248. The United States v. Washington court describes the tribe’s party to the Stevens Treaties as
“heavily dependent upon harvesting anadromous fish . . . particularly salmon.” Washington I, 384 F.
Supp. 312, 355 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). In one of the original treaty
rights interpretation cases, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), the United States Supreme
Court noted that fishing was “not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the
atmosphere they breathed.” Id. at 381.
249. See Kurihara et al., supra note 6, at 91.
250. A Sovereign People, supra note 194 (noting that the Lummi reservation includes 13,000
acres of tidelands).
251. The Swinomish People, supra note 196 (noting that the Swinomish reservation includes 2900
acres of tidelands).
252. See generally Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 327.
253. See Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5; United States v. Washington
(Washington II), 506 F. Supp. 187, 189 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 694 F.2d
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the tribes,254 this single sentence has instead produced over a century of
litigation.255
In 1974, the famous Judge Boldt opinion, United States v.
Washington (Washington I),256 clarified Tribal fishing rights under the
Treaties. Judge Boldt affirmed that tribal members have a protected right
to fish from their traditional sites (“usual and accustomed grounds and
stations”).257 This right remains in force even if those stations are outside
modern reservation boundaries, or on private property owned by nonIndians.258 Tribes, in turn, are obliged to allow non-Indians to fish
alongside them.259 However, the Treaties reserve a certain portion of the
total sustainably harvestable catch for the Tribes: enough to make a
“moderate living,” or fifty percent, whichever is lower.260 Later
decisions applied these rules to shellfish as well, finding that shellfish
are “fish” under the Treaties.261 Thus, the Tribes also have the right to
harvest shellfish both on and off-reservation—even if the “usual and
accustomed” harvesting location is currently occupied by a commercial
grower.262
Although the Treaties are silent on the specific location or amount of
fish to be harvested,263 the United States Supreme Court ultimately
upheld Judge Boldt’s “usual and accustomed” stations interpretation, as
well as the fifty-fifty allocation of the harvest.264 In its decision, the
1374 (9th Cir. 1982).
254. “A primary concern of the Indians whose way of life was so heavily dependent upon
harvesting anadromous fish, was that they have freedom to move about to gather food, particularly
salmon.” Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 355.
255. Winans was the first of the Stevens Treaty cases to come before the U.S. Supreme Court. See
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
256. 384 F. Supp. 312, 355 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
257. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 331.
258. Id.
259. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 668
n.12 (1979).
260. Id. at 686. Neither party has a right to destroy the treaty resource (i.e., the fishery). See
United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975).
261. United States v. Washington, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1427 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff’d, 157 F.3d
630 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Washington, 898 F. Supp. 1453 (W.D. Wash. 1995), aff’d, 157
F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1998).
262. See generally Washington, 873 F. Supp. at 1427; Washington, 898 F. Supp. 1453. Note that
the Treaties do contain a clause limiting tribal shellfish rights relative to non-Indian individuals.
This so-called “Shellfish Proviso” states that Indians “shall not take shellfish from any beds staked
or cultivated by citizens.” Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. V.
263. Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5; see also Washington II, 506 F. Supp. 187,
189 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982).
264. Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5; see also Washington II, 506 F. Supp. at 189.
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Court reemphasized the “vital importance of the fisheries”265 to the
Tribes, having previously stated in United States v. Winans266 that
fishing was “not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than
the atmosphere they breathed.”267 Perhaps more significantly, the Court
reaffirmed the unique canons of statutory interpretation that modern
American courts apply when analyzing tribal treaties.268 Generally
speaking, “treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements,
and to ascertain their meaning [courts] may look beyond the written
words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical
construction adopted by the parties.”269
Given that accurate historical information is not always available,
these canons of interpretation allow ambiguity to be resolved in favor of
tribes.270 In the context of United States v. Washington, courts apply this
canon by considering what the Tribes believed the Treaties to guarantee
to be as important as the text itself.271 Here, the tribes believed—and still
believe—that the Treaties guaranteed them the right to a significant
amount of fish, forever.272 This interpretation is based on direct
representations made by Governor Stevens.273 Stevens told the Tribes,
“this paper secures your fish.”274 As the Ninth Circuit observed,
“[d]uring the negotiations, the United States repeatedly assured the
Indians that they would continue to enjoy a permanent right to fish as
they always had in the places where they always had.”275 On the strength
of this record, both the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Tribes’ right to take up to fifty percent of the
available fish from their usual and accustomed stations.276
265. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 666
n.12 (1979).
266. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
267. Id. at 381.
268. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943).
269. Id.
270. See United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 643 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that courts
“[h]ave uniformly held that treaties must be liberally construed in favor of establishing Indian
rights.”).
271. “[I]importance should be given to the Indians’ likely understanding of the . . . words in the
treaties and especially the reference to the “‘right of taking fish,’” Wash. State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. at 678.
272. Answering Brief of the Appellee-Cross-Appellant Indian Tribes at 17, United States v.
Washington, No. 13-35474 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2014).
273. State v. Moses, 79 Wash. 2d 104, 139, 483 P.2d 838, 851 (1971).
274. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. at 667 n.11.
275. Washington, 157 F.3d at 649.
276. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. at 668; Washington I,
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The United States v. Washington Culverts Litigation: A Possible
Model for Stevens Treaties Claims Based on Ocean Acidification

The purpose of Judge Boldt’s holding in Washington I is to fairly
allocate a shared resource—the available fishing stations are divided
between Indians and non-Indians, as is the total annual catch.277
Underlying this allocation is the assumption that fish will always be
available.278 However, declining fish runs, under pressure from
overfishing, habitat destruction, and water quality-related harms, soon
called this assumption into question.279 In fact, Judge Boldt himself
recognized that because the “right secured by the treaties . . . exists in
part to provide a volume of fish which is sufficient to the fair needs of
the tribe . . . . Neither the Indians nor the non-Indians may fish in a
manner so as to destroy the resource.”280 Short of total destruction,
however, it was unclear what obligation the parties had to preserve their
common resource—or at the very least, to avoid becoming the agent of
harm. These questions are at the heart of the ongoing United States v.
Washington culverts sub-proceeding.
In 2001, the Tribes filed suit against the State of Washington alleging
violations of the Treaties.281 The Tribes claimed that by constructing and
maintaining a statewide system of culverts that blocked salmon from
returning upstream, Washington limited the number of salmon returning
to the Tribes’ usual and accustomed stations.282 The Tribes argued that
the culverts impacted salmon runs “to the extent that such diminishment
impairs the Tribes’ ability to earn a moderate living from their
fisheries.”283 Joined by the United States, the Tribes sought declaratory
and injunctive relief, asking the court to affirm their interpretation of the
Treaties and order the removal of the offending culverts.284 On August
384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
277. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 401.
278. Id. at 430.
279. C. JEFF CEDERHOLM ET AL., PACIFIC SALMON AND WILDLIFE—ECOLOGICAL CONTEXTS,
RELATIONSHIPS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT iv (2d ed. 2000).
280. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 401 (emphasis added).
281. United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 828, 889–90 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (discussing
the six-year history of the culverts sub-proceeding).
282. Id.
283. Plaintiff Tribes’ Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, at 1, United States v. Washington, No. C70-9213, 2006 WL 2882968 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
14, 2006), 2006 WL 2825386 (emphasis added).
284. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 889–90 (discussing the six-year history of the culverts subproceeding).
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23, 2007, the district court ruled in favor of the Tribes.285 The court then
held a seven day bench trial to determine the appropriate remedy (e.g.,
which culverts should be removed and how quickly).286 Finally, on
March 29, 2013, more than a decade after the Tribes’ original Request
for Determination, the court issued its final memorandum order and
permanent injunction.287
Finding in favor of the Tribes, the district court held that “[t]he right
of taking fish, secured to the Tribes in the Stevens Treaties, imposes a
duty upon the State to refrain from building or operating culverts under
State-maintained roads that hinder fish passage and thereby diminish the
number of fish that would otherwise be available for Tribal harvest.”288
Washington’s construction and maintenance of culverts impededing fish
return violated the State’s duty under the Treaties. Accordingly, the
court ordered Washington to expedite removal of the harmful culverts.289
The district court’s holding in this case is instructive in that the court
frames the State’s duty as a negative one. Rather than implying a
positive duty to preserve or conserve the fisheries, the court instead finds
that the culverts represent a failure of Washington’s negative duty—to
refrain from harming the fish supply.290 While the court-ordered remedy
(timely culvert removal) requires the State to take “positive” action, this
does not change the negative nature of the underlying duty: noninterference with tribal rights to fish. Because a treaty allocating fish
would be undermined by the destruction of the fishery, the court in
Washington I found that the Treaties’ fishing clauses necessarily imply a
restriction on each party’s authority to destroy their shared resource.291
However, Judge Boldt’s holding stops short of finding a general fishery
conservation interest inherent in the Treaties—Washington I’s limitation
on the parties vests only once fish populations decline nearly to the point
of extinction.292
In 1980, the district court further considered whether the Treaties
impose habitat protection responsibilities on the State (“Phase II” of the

285. Id.
286. See generally United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1023–24 (W.D. Wash.
2013) (issuing permanent injunction regarding Culvert Correction).
287. Id.
288. United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 828, 889–90 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1975).
292. Id.
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United States v. Washington saga).293 Although the court held that the
Treaties do impose habitat protection duties, it again phrased this
obligation negatively.294 The district court held that the Treaties required
Washington to “refrain from degrading the fish habitat to an extent that
would deprive the tribes of their moderate living needs.”295
Characterizing a proactive conservational responsibility as a negative
treaty right may begin to strain credulity. Perhaps indicating an
awareness of this critique, the Washington II opinion directly addresses
the negative rights issue:
Contrary to the State’s apprehensions . . . this case [does not]
involve an attempt by plaintiffs to impose an affirmative duty on
the State to protect the fish habitat. Rather, plaintiffs seek the
recognition of a negative duty such that when the State exercises
its broad regulatory powers it does not impair the environmental
conditions necessary for the survival of the treaty fish.296
Because the district court’s interpretation would require Washington
to consider and avoid harm to fish habitat in the course of its normal
exercise of regulatory power, it went further than Judge Boldt’s
relatively narrow prohibition of destruction in Washington I.297
After years of litigation, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated
the district court’s habitat conservation holding in Washington II.298
Interestingly, the vacatur did not explicitly reject the district court’s
treaty interpretation. The Ninth Circuit could simply have found that a
habitat conservation duty cannot be implied from the Treaties; instead,
the panel took issue with the factual standard required to support a
specific articulation of Washington’s treaty responsibilities.299 The
Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s sweeping prohibition against a
category of state actions (i.e., those harmful to fish) was “contrary to the
exercise of sound judicial discretion” in the context of a facial challenge
like Washington II.300 What was missing, in the panel’s view, was a
293. See generally Washington II, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982).
294. Id. at 208.
295. See id.
296. Id. at 206–07.
297. In this view, a maximally invasive duty would take the additional step of requiring
affirmative action and may run afoul of the constitutional prohibition against state conscription. Id.
at 208; see also Washington I, 384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1975).
298. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357–58 (1985).
299. Id.
300. Id.
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detailed factual record carefully demonstrating the connection between
specific state actions and harm to treaty-protected salmon.301 Because
the court reached the decision to vacate on technical grounds,302 it
remained silent on the underlying question of treaty interpretation. The
Ninth Circuit’s silence seems to imply that the Treaties may indeed
support the very type of conservation obligation found by the district
court—provided the duty is “defin[ed] and articulat[ed] upon concrete
facts which underlie a dispute.”303
The U.S. v. Washington culverts litigation, by establishing that
Washington has a concrete duty to remedy harm to treaty-protected
salmon habitat, succeeds where Washington II failed. As discussed, the
district court’s attempt in Washington II to expand Judge Boldt’s narrow
prohibition against fishery destruction was ultimately unsuccessful.304 In
response, the parties in the culverts litigation adopted a narrower legal
strategy: whether or not the Treaties impose a general habitat
conservation duty on Washington, the parties argued that the Treaties do
impose a negative duty on the State to refrain from specific actions
known to harm tribal salmon.305 Moreover, the Tribes and United States
arrived in court armed with a detailed factual record demonstrating how
building and maintaining culverts (the specific state action) led to a
reduction in the number of fish available to tribes (the treaty-proscribed
harm).306
On appeal, the parties’ briefs in the culverts litigation discuss the
Washington II “concrete facts” standard in some detail.307 In the reply
brief of the United States, for example, the government dedicates a
section to the argument that the factual record adequately supports Judge
Martinez’s permanent injunction.308 The key distinction, according to the
United States, is that the respondents need not demonstrate every aspect
of the complex science behind declining salmon runs to sustain their
case. Instead, the only truly important fact is not in dispute: that
Washington constructs and maintains culverts that harm treaty-protected

301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Response Brief of the United States of America at 45–47, United States v. Washington, No.
13-35474 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2014).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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salmon.309
In addition, the plaintiffs in the culverts case avoided the concerns
expressed in Washington II by seeking a narrowly tailored remedy—as
opposed to asking the court to impose undefined conservation duties on
the State.310 In terms of effort and cost, the Martinez order is more
immediately burdensome on the State than the general conservation duty
contemplated in Washington II.311 At the same time, the order is also
more limited in scope: the injunction only applies to culverts on state
land.312 Furthermore, the order establishes a reasonable removal
schedule (setting priority based on the number of fish blocked), rather
than requiring the immediate removal of all harmful culverts.313
If upheld on appeal, the culverts case may serve as a potential model
for treaty-based ocean acidification claims. The culverts litigation
demonstrates that the Treaties can be interpreted to compel protective
state action.314 Moreover, the threshold at which these treaty protections
vest—when the fisheries are no longer adequate to support a “moderate
living” for the Tribes315—is already met. In the culverts opinion, Judge
Martinez found as a matter of law that tribal income from fishing is
already below the “moderate living” threshold.316 Therefore, this
element is satisfied with respect to the United States v. Washington line
of cases.317 Importantly, the treaty fishing clauses describe tribal rights
in terms of guaranteed income; the Treaties are agnostic as to the cause
of income impairment.318 Therefore, the threshold for abrogating the
Treaties is simply when—as now—there are too few fish at the Tribes’
usual and accustomed stations to meet the “moderate living” standard.319
The cause of this harm, whether driven by culverts or ocean
acidification, should not define the shape of the right itself. In either
scenario, the relevant harm is the harm to tribal income. So long as there

309. Id.
310. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357–58 (9th Cir. 1985).
311. United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1023–24 (W.D. Wash. 2013); Washington,
759 F.2d at 1357–58.
312. Response Brief of the United States of America, supra note 305, at 45.
313. Id.
314. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 986; Washington, 759 F.2d at 1357–
58.
315. Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5.
316. United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 828 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
317. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 626 F. Supp. 1405, 1476–78 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
318. Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5.
319. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 889–90.
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are too few salmon to generate a moderate income from fishing, the
guarantees of the Treaties are not being met.320 The logic for ocean
acidification and tribal treaty rights to shellfish is similar: the right of
access to usual and accustomed tidelands and beaches is of little use if
the water is too acidic to support oyster fertilization and cultivation.
If Tribes were to pair an ocean acidification treaty rights claim with
the CWA strategy discussed in Part II, the requested remedy for the
treaty claim could be specific enforcement of the acidification TMDL. In
addition to addressing Houck’s critique of TMDLs, the treaty claim
itself would also be strengthened by limiting its requested relief to
enforcement of existing state regulations. By contrast, a standalone
treaty claim would likely founder on the shoals of Washington II: any
effective remedy would necessarily involve some form of novel
regulation, which is far more ambitious than the district court’s (failed)
attempt to impose a state duty to refrain from degrading fish habitat.321
Instead, seeking improved enforcement of an additional TMDL is both
narrower and more analogous to the injunctive dynamic in the culverts
litigation. In that case, Washington State had already initiated a program
to remove the offending culverts by the time the district court issued the
final injunction in 2013. Instead of requiring Washington to initiate a
new culvert removal process, Judge Martinez ordered the state to expand
and improve its existing program.322 Similarly, requiring Washington
State to redouble its efforts to enforce an existing TMDL would,
technically speaking, be “working within the system” rather than seeking
to compel the state to promulgate a novel regulatory program.
CONCLUSION
Ocean acidification—and the release of CO2 that drives it—represents
a real and present danger to a host of marine organisms. The danger is
real for humans as well, including aquaculture-dependent Native
American tribes. Given the difficulty in obtaining tort relief for causally
complex harms, updating the CWA water quality criteria provides a
potential path to regulation of ocean acidification via the TMDL regime.
320. See generally United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985); Treaty of Point
Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5.
321. Washington II, 506 F. Supp. 187, 208 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 694
F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982).
322. Specifically, the district court ordered the State to prioritize culvert removal based on the
significance of harm. The court also rejected Washington’s proposed schedule, noting that at its preorder pace the State would need 100 years to remove all the affected culverts. See Washington, 20
F. Supp. 3d at 889–90.

18 - LeMay.docx (Do Not Delete)

400

3/27/2016 3:50 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:361

While TMDL enforcement for non-point sources is problematic, it is
possible that tribal treaty rights claims could bolster TMDL
enforcement. Whatever the solution, it is clear that complex
environmental pollution processes like ocean acidification require an
evolved regulatory response. America’s current environmental
regulatory regime, divided amongst media-specific pollution control
statutes, is outclassed by trans-media pollutants like CO2.

